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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:







HE El Paso Court of Appeals in Jaime v. State determined
whether collateral estoppel barred the defendant's prosecution in
a request for pretrial habeas relief.' The State sought to prosecute
the defendant for aggravated assault with a motor vehicle and the defen-
dant brought a habeas corpus petition, alleging that the finding of "no
evidence" that he was driving the vehicle in an earlier probation revoca-
tion proceeding based on the same alleged incident collaterally estopped
the State from relitigating the issue.2 The trial court denied the pretrial
writ.3 The court of appeals reversed, finding that the State had failed in
the previous proceeding to prove that the defendant was driving the vehi-
cle, and thus, the State was estopped from rearguing that issue.4
In Smith v. State, the appellant and five others were charged with mur-
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1. Jaime v. State, 81 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. ref'd).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 927.
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der.5 The appellant's case was dismissed pursuant to an agreement with
the prosecutor and the appellant entered into an immunity agreement
with the prosecutor. However, two years later, the appellant's case was
re-opened by a new prosecutor, and he was convicted despite his attempt
to enforce the immunity agreement. The court of appeals affirmed his
conviction, deciding that the immunity agreement was unenforceable be-
cause the trial court had not approved the agreement. The court of crimi-
nal appeals held that: (1) the fact that the judge did not incorporate the
terms of the immunity agreement into the order of dismissal did not
render the agreement unenforceable because the trial court need not
know the prosecutor's reasons for dismissal; (2) the fact that the order of
dismissal did not dismiss the case "with prejudice" did not render the
agreement unenforceable; and (3) the trial court need not be aware of the
terms of the immunity agreement for the agreement to be enforceable
because the prosecutor, not the trial court, retains the power to assign the
reasons that would justify a dismissal.6
A. INDICTMENT
In State v. Doe, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that section 255.001
of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional in its entirety under the
First Amendment. 7 Appellant claimed that the statute was an unconstitu-
tional intrusion into his right to political free speech, and that the indict-
ment thus failed to allege a crime.8 Under the statute, anyone who
contracted to print, publish, or broadcast a political advertisement had to
identify himself or the person he represented within the advertisement. 9
The State argued that it had three compelling interests that justified the
restraint on free speech: "(1) deterring and punishing political corruption;
(2) notifying the public of any allegiance a particular candidate might feel
toward the publisher of the communication; and (3) providing a method
of detecting those expenditures which appear to be from individuals, but
in reality come from political action committees or corporations.' 10 In
rejecting these justifications, the court of appeals compared the statute at
issue to that held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission." There, "the Supreme Court
held that providing voters with additional relevant information did not
justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures he
would otherwise omit.' 2 The court of appeals similarly held that section
255.001's "broad proscription on anonymous political speech reach[ed]
5. Smith v. State, 70 S.W.3d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
6. Id. at 853, 854-55.
7. State v. Doe, 61 S.W.3d 99, 101 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. granted).
8. Id.
9. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.001 (Vernon 2003).
10. Doe, 61 S.W.3d at 103.
11. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
12. Doe, 61 S.W.3d at 104.
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well beyond the conduct targeted by the State."'1 3 As well, the State
could not impinge on free "speech simply to obtain the ancillary benefit
of detecting [possible] violations of other laws.' 4
In Santana v. State, the defendant appealed his conviction for Class A
misdemeanor mischief arising out of his unpaid siphoning of electrical
power from a utility line.'5 In rejecting the appellant's first ground of
error, the court held that, under section 28.03 of the Texas Penal Code,
the State did not need to charge or prove pecuniary loss as an element of
Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief because the defendant's conduct
was within the class described in section 28.03(b)(3)(B), i.e., tampering
with a public utility.16 The appellant also claimed that there was a "fatal
variance between the information and the [evidence presented] at
trial."' 17 The information charged that the defendant diverted power
from a meter and prevented it from being correctly registered, whereas
the evidence at trial showed that he could not have diverted power from
the meter because it was broken and that he could not have prevented
the power from being registered because he never tampered with the
meter. The court held that the defendant did not demonstrate the requi-
site surprise or prejudice because the information informed the defendant
of the charge against him to sufficiently prepare for trial and would pre-
vent the appellant from being prosecuted against for diverting the elec-
tricity that was the subject of the current prosecution.' 8
In Hall v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals determined whether ag-
gravated assault by threat is a lesser included offense of the charged mur-
der offenses under article 37.09(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.' 9 A jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault by
threat although the state had charged him with murder. 20 On appeal, the
defendant contended that "the trial court [lacked] jurisdiction to convict
him of aggravated assault ... because that particular crime is not a lesser
included offense of murder. '' 21 The court of appeals vacated the trial
court's judgment, holding that "the statutory elements of the offense
sought as a lesser included offense included at least one fact not required
to be proved as an element of the offense charged. '22 Accordingly, the
court concluded "that aggravated assault by threat was not a lesser in-
cluded offense of the indicted murder offenses under article 37.09(1)."23
In State v. Markovich, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that
section 42.05 of the Texas Penal Code is not unconstitutionally vague on
13. Id. at 106.
14. Id. at 105.
15. Santana v. State, 59 S.W.3d 187, 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
16. Id. at 193.
17. Id. at 189.
18. Id. at 195-96.
19. Hall v. State, 81 S.W.3d 927, 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
20. Id.
21. Id.




its face.24 The defendant "was charged with the Class B misdemeanor
offense of Disrupting [a] Meeting or Procession" under Texas Penal Code
section 42.05.25 The defendant filed a pre-trial motion to quash the com-
plaint, alleging that the statute was unconstitutional under "the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of
the Texas Constitution. '26 The defendant also "argued that the State's
information was defective because it failed to include the substantial im-
pairment language ... provided ... in Morehead v. State."'27 After "[t]he
state made an oral motion to amend the information to add... substan-
tial impairment language. The trial court granted both the State's and
[defendant's] motions. ' 28 The state appealed and the court of appeals
reversed.29 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, determining that
section 42.05 "communicates its reach in words of common understand-
ing,"' 30 and thus "provides guidelines for law enforcement and fair notice
to citizens" regarding the type of conduct the statute prohibits.31
In Marable v. State, the court granted for review the issue: "Whether
the appellant had sufficient notice of the theory of culpability by which
the State would seek conviction for delivery of a controlled substance?" 32
Appellant asserted "that he did not receive adequate notice to prepare
his defense because the State did not allege in the indictment that it
would prove actual delivery by the law of parties. '33 The court affirmed
the judgment of the court of appeals based on the "well-settled [law] that
the law of parties need not be pled in the indictment. '34
Ex Parte Bailey considered whether a subsequent prosecution alleging
a different victim under a second set of indictments is jeopardy barred.35
The appellants contended "that since a separate offense is not created by
merely changing the name of the complainant, prosecution under the sec-
ond set of indictments [was] a violation of federal double jeopardy princi-
ples."' 36 The court recognized that "[t]raditionally, courts in Texas have
held that an acquittal because of a variance between the pleading and the
proof does not bar reprosecution on a new charge alleging that version of
the offense which the States evidence proved in the first trial."'37 In this
case, the court concluded that the evidence of the appellants stealing
money from a named person "would not sustain a conviction under the
24. State v. Markovich, 77 S.W.3d 274, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
25. Id. at 275.
26. Id. at 276.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 277.
30. Id. at 280 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 332 (1988)).
31. Id.
32. Marable v. State, 85 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
33. Id. (quoting Marble v. State, 990 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999),
affd, 85 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc)).
34. Id. at 287-88.
35. Ex Parte Bailey, 87 S.W.3d 122, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
36. Id. at 126.
37. Id. at 126-27.
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indictment alleging the victim to be the City of Houston. '38 Thus, the
court held that "the offenses [were] not the same for double jeopardy
purposes" since the proof of one will not prove the other and, accord-
ingly, it affirmed the court of appeals. 39
In Puente v. State, the appellant pled guilty to one indictment misjoin-
ing two misdemeanor charges with one felony charge. 40 The trial court
later severed the misdemeanor charges from the felony charge and or-
dered that the appellant could not be prosecuted over objection in county
court because the two-year statute of limitations had run on the misde-
meanor charges. The appellant still claimed that he was entitled to have
his entire conviction declared void due to the misjoinder. The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the defendant was only entitled to relief re-
garding the misdemeanor charges because the district court did not have
jurisdiction over those charges. 41 The court noted that "[t]he fact that a
portion of an indictment, judgment, or sentence may be invalid does not
necessarily mean that the entire indictment, judgment, or sentence is in-
valid or 'void."' 42 The court further held that the trial court had jurisdic-
tion over the felony charge and, because the "appellant failed to show
that he would not have pled guilty to the felony charges if the misde-
meanor charges had been filed separately in county court," and he has
not suffered any harm by the misjoinder, the felony conviction was not
void.43
In Fuller v. State, the appellant was charged in his indictment with com-
mitting the offense of "injury to an elderly individual" against Olen M.
Fuller.44 After the appellant was convicted based upon evidence that he
caused injury to "Mr. Fuller" or "Buddy," the appellant appealed on the
basis that the evidence at trial was insufficient for a "conviction because
the prosecution failed to prove the victim's name as alleged in the indict-
ment."' 45 The court of appeals agreed with the appellant. The Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The court noted that,
under Jackson v. Virginia, the proper federal due process inquiry "in the
case [was] whether the victim's name [was] a substantive element of the
criminal offense as defined by state law."' 46 Because state law does not
define the victim's name as an element of the offense for which the appel-
lant was charged, the court held that "[t]he prosecution's failure to prove
the victim's name exactly as [charged] in the indictment [did] not . . .
make the evidence insufficient to support [the] appellant's conviction. '47
Furthermore, the court held that the evidence was sufficient under the
38. Id. at 127.
39. Id.
40. Puente v. State, 71 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
41. Id. at 341.
42. Id. at 344.
43. Id. at 341-42.
44. Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
45. Id. at 251-52.
46. Id. at 252 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
47. Id. at 253.
2003] 1449
SMU LAW REVIEW
Gollihar v. State state law sufficiency standard as well because, in a case
where there is a variance between the indictment and the proof offered at
trial, the evidence fails only if the variance is material. 48
B. VOIR DIRE
In Standefer v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether
asking a juror during voir dire "would you presume someone guilty if he
or she refused to take a breath test on their refusal alone?" was an im-
proper attempt to commit the juror.49 A commitment question, i.e., a
question that attempts to bind a juror to a verdict based on a hypothetical
set of facts, while usually improper, may be proper if the "law requires a
certain type of commitment," e.g., "whether they could follow a law that
requires them to disregard illegally obtained evidence. ' 50 When the an-
swer to the question would not lead to a valid challenge for cause, how-
ever, the question is an impermissible commitment question. 51 Applying
these principles to the question at issue, the court found the question to
be impermissible because a jury may permissibly presume guilt from the
refusal to take a breath test, and thus "a challenge for cause based upon
the sufficiency implications of an item of evidence would be
inappropriate. 52
In Guzman v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
"'dual motivation' defense to a Batson peremptory strike challenge. '53
During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his "peremptory strikes against
six venirepersons, all of whom were either Hispanic or African-Ameri-
can," and gave reasons for its strikes upon challenge from the defen-
dant.5 4 Only the strike of one juror, however, was at issue on appeal and
the intermediate court sustained the defendant's challenge to that juror
"because the prosecutor's dual motive for striking that juror was not, as a
matter of law, gender-neutral. '55 Reaffirming its plurality opinion in Hill
v. State,5 6 the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded to the
trial court, holding that (1) "when the motives behind a challenged per-
emptory strike are 'mixed,' . . . if the striking party shows that he [or she]
would have struck the juror based only on the neutral reasons, then the
strike does not violate the juror's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the law; 5 7" and (2) the trial court's failure to explicitly find
that the prosecutor offered adequate neutral reasons to meet his burden
of proof necessitated remand.5 8
48. Id. at 254.
49. Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, '179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
50. Id. at 181 n.16.
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id. at 183.
53. Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id. at 245.
56. Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
57. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 244.
58. Id. at 255.
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In Hutchinson v. State,59 "after voir dire, appellant asserted that the
state had excused five of seven African-Americans on the panel and ob-
jected to the state's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges pursuant
to Batson . ",60 "After the Baston challenge was raised, the prosecutor
articulated race-neutral explanations for striking four of the [five] venire
members. '61 After appellant's conviction, "[t]he court of appeals abated
the appeal and remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions to
[conduct] a new Batson hearing and to make written findings and conclu-
sions as to whether [any] particular venire member had been struck for
racial reasons. '62 "On return from remand, the court of appeals ... con-
cluded that the trial court's denial of the Batson challenge was not er-
ror."'63 The Court of Criminal Appeals held "that the court of appeals
was authorized to abate the appeal and order the trial court to supple-
ment the record" about the fifth venire member because the "case law
leads to the conclusion, that when there has been a prima facie showing
of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes but no Batson hearing, the
supplemented record represents material omitted from the record." 64
Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
In Rivera v. State, the appellant complained about the exclusion of a
question during voir dire, the trial court's decision not to let him intro-
duce the victim's prior conviction, and improper argument by the prose-
cutor during closing argument.65 First, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that, although the appellant was improperly forbidden from asking
his proper commitment question at voir dire, the trial court's error was
harmless. 66 The appellant was instructed that he could ask his question to
the jury in a more general manner. However, he refused to do so. Fur-
thermore, because the appellant continued in voir dire to pose his ques-
tion to the jury in several different ways, he was "able to intelligently
exercise his peremptory challenges." The appellant also argued that, be-
cause one of the witnesses testified about the meaning of the victim's
nickname ("Psycho"), the witness was a character witness who opened
the door to other evidence regarding the victim's peaceable character.
However, the court held that the witness was testifying "as an eyewitness,
not as a character witness," and testimony regarding the victim's funny
personality did not equate to character testimony.67 Thus, evidence re-
garding the victim's conviction for family violence was excluded. Finally,
the court held that the prosecutor's statements during closing argument
were clearly pleas for law enforcement rather than improper appeals to
community expectations or the introduction of evidence outside of the
59. Hutchinson v. State, 86 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).




64. Id. at 639-40.
65. Rivera v. State, 82 S.W.3d 64, 66-68 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).
66. Id. at 67.
67. Id. at 67-68.
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record; therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.68
In Oulare v. State, the appellant argued that the trial judge's comments
during voir dire required a reversal of the judgment.69 The court of ap-
peals noted, however, that the appellant did not object and thus, absent a
fundamental error, waived his right to appeal issues related to the judge's
questions during voir dire. Furthermore, the court noted that the judge's
comments encouraging the jurors not to believe someone "just because of
their occupation" properly sought to "instruct the juror to have an open,
unbiased mind when hearing the evidence."'70 Furthermore, far from be-
ing a fundamental error, the judge's comments instructing the jury about
"their role in our judicial system" were appropriate and did not, as the
appellant claimed, inform the venire that "it was acting on behalf of the
prosecution. '71 Thus, because the appellant failed to object to the judge's
comments during trial, the appellant failed to preserve these issues for
appeal. 72
In Smith v. State, the defendant argued that comments made by pro-
spective jurors during voir dire amounted to testimony and he was not
permitted to cross-examine any of the venire members.73 In this DWI
case, the venire members responded to the State's questions with answers
that they believed that a person can be intoxicated with a blood-alcohol
concentration below 0.08.74 The court of appeals rejected Smith's argu-
ment "that the trial court had an 'affirmative' duty to 'personally inter-
vene'" and that this "testimony" violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.75
II. TRIAL
In Kerr v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals determined whether a
defendant's voluntary absence from most parts of his trial "for the misde-
meanor offense of simulating legal process" constituted reversible er-
ror.76 Before jury selection began, the defendant appeared and gave
"inept and nonresponsive" answers to the court's questions. 77 The defen-
dant "then voluntarily left the courtroom," and neither he "nor his coun-
sel [was] present for jury selection, presentation of evidence, or
assessment of punishment. '78 The jury found the defendant guilty and
the court assessed punishment. 79 The defendant later moved to set aside
68. Id. at 69-71.
69. Oulare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
70. Id. at 232, 234.
71. Id. at 234.
72. Id.
73. Smith v. State, 65 S.W.3d 332, 348 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 348-49.
76. Kerr v. State, 83 S.W.3d 832, 833 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
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the verdict, but the trial court refused and proceeded to sentence him.80
On appeal, the defendant argued that "the trial court failed to comply
with Article 33.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure."' 8' The State
argued that the defendant "had entered a plea before trial began."82 The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court's
error was harmful because the defendant was unable to challenge the
State's evidence, cross-examine the State's witnesses, or present his ver-
sion of the facts or his defenses.83
In Zamorano v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined
whether "the state's negligence caused a delay" in the defendant's trial,
entitling the defendant to relief.84 The trial court denied the defendant's
two speedy trial motions despite his case for driving while intoxicated
remaining on the docket for nearly four years.85 The court of appeals
affirmed, applying the federal constitutional speedy trial factors in Barker
v. Wingo.86 The court of criminal appeals reversed and remanded, hold-
ing "that all four [Barker v. Wingo] factors weigh[ed] in favor of relief. '87
The length of the nearly three-year initial delay was presumptively preju-
dicial, "the delay was [due to] the State's negligence," the defendant as-
serted his right to speedy trial twice, and the defendant presented
"evidence of prejudice ... the state failed to rebut. ' 88
A. EVIDENCE
In Roquemore v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was
error to admit evidence that was obtained by taking an arrested juvenile
to the location of stolen property instead of first transporting the juvenile
to a juvenile office, as required by section 52.02(a) of the Texas Family
Code. 89 After being arrested and given his Miranda warnings, the appel-
lant, who was a juvenile certified to be tried as an adult, cooperated with
the police and gave them the location of stolen property. The "evidence
showed that the [police] first took the appellant to recover the stolen
property before they transported him to the juvenile division." This vio-
lated section 52.02(a), which requires that when a juvenile is taken into
custody he must be taken to the juvenile "'division without unnecessary
delay and without first taking the child anywhere else."' 90 The court thus
held that, even though "the officers deviated from the proper route at
appellant's [request]," the request of a juvenile could not override "the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 834.
83. Id.
84. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
85. Id. at 646.
86. Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)).
87. Id. at 654.
88. Id. at 654-55.
89. Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 872 (Tex. Crim. App.-2001) (en banc).
90. Id. at 867 (quoting Comer v. State, 776 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
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clear mandate of a statute [intended] to protect him." 91 Because the
property "would not have been [recovered] at that time" absent the viola-
tion of section 52.02(a), there was a clear causal link "between the recov-
ery of the stolen property and the illegal[ ]" conduct, mandating the
suppression of that evidence.92
The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Hayden v. State that, in certain
circumstances, the State's delivery of witness statements that describe ex-
traneous offenses satisfies the notice requirement of Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b).93 The appellant timely requested that the State provide
him with notice of extraneous offenses that it intended to introduce in its
case-in-chief, as required by Rule 404(b). In response, the State provided
the appellant with two witness statements. The appellant argued that the
delivery of these statements "did not inform [him] of whether the State
had any intent to introduce such evidence at trial."' 94 In holding other-
wise, the court held that whether delivery of witnesses statements by the
State constituted "reasonable notice" of the State's intent was a factual
determination within the discretion of the trial court.95 A key determi-
nant is the length of time between the defendant's request and the state's
delivery, i.e., "[i]f the State [delivers] the statements ... shortly after re-
ceiving the request for notice," counsel should know that the delivery is
in response to the notice. In this case, the record did not reflect when the
State delivered the witness statements. Absent any objection regarding
the timing of the delivery, the court could not "conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion on finding that the State had provided reason-
able notice."'96
In Goodman v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the exis-
tence of alternative causation theories does not render the evidence fac-
tually insufficient to support a conviction.97 The defendant was convicted
of causing bodily injury to a child. The court of appeals reversed the
conviction, giving five alternate theories of the cause of the child's inju-
ries that it believed were more plausible than the State's theory, and thus
greatly outweighed any evidence in support of the verdict.98 The Court
of Criminal Appeals held that the court of appeals was not allowed to
supplant the jury's findings in this regard, i.e., that the jury could have
considered but rejected these theories in favor of that proffered by the
State.99 Instead, courts should only sustain insufficient evidence points
when either "the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding of
a vital fact, or ... the finding of a vital fact is so contrary to the great
91. Id. at 870.
92. Id. at 871-72.
93. Hayden v. State, 66 S.W.3d 269, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
94. Id. at 270.
95. Id. at 272-73.
96. Id. at 273.
97. Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc).
98. Goodman v. State, 5 S.W.3d 891, 907 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet.
granted).
99. Goodman, 66 S.W.3d at 287.
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weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong."'100
In Thomas v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded "that a
written instrument is required for an 'evidence of indebtedness' under the
Texas Securities Act." 101 Appellant was convicted under the Act for
soliciting "investments" in a business venture that he instead used to
cover personal expenses. There were never any written agreements con-
cerning the so-called investments, no shares, notes, or bonds were issued,
and no funds were ever distributed. The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's judgment, holding that "'evidence of indebtedness' [was]
grouped with written instruments that all acknowledge the owing of
money by agreement, [and thus] an 'evidence of indebtedness' must also
be in writing."' 10 2
The court begins its analysis by agreement with the court of appeals'
reliance on the ejusdem generis doctrine, which "states that when inter-
preting general words that follow an enumeration of particular or specific
things, the meaning of those general words should be confined to things
of the same kind."'1 3 Thus, because "evidence of indebtedness" was part
of a list of items that required a writing, it should also require a writing.
Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on a federal case, S.E.C. v.
Addison, which addressed a similar question under the Federal Securities
Act of 1933.104 The court also notes that scholars have interpreted "evi-
dence of indebtedness" to require a writing.10 5 The court ends by noting
that the form of the writing is not important, and that if "a defendant sells
or offers to sell an 'evidence of indebtedness' that does not actually exits
or was never actually issued, he is still subject to criminal penalty."' 10 6
In Vega v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined whether a
statement that the juvenile defendant gave to Illinois police following her
arrest for capital murder on a Texas warrant was admissible under sec-
tion 51.095 of the Family Code.' 0 7 The defendant claimed that the state-
ment was inadmissible because it did not comply with Texas law. 108 "The
state [maintained] that because the defendant was in Illinois when she
gave the statement, Illinois law should apply and that the statement was
admissible under Illinois law." 109 The court of appeals held the statement
was inadmissible, relying on Davidson v. State.I10 The Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that although the statement vi-
olated the Family Code, the violation did not determine the issue of ad-
100. Id. at 285 (quoting Claver, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of
Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 366 (1960)).
101. Thomas v. State, 65 S.W.3d 38, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
102. Thomas v. State, 3 S.W.3d 89, 94 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. granted).
103. Thomas, 65 S.W.3d at 41 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (6th ed. 1990)).
104. S.E.C. v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
105. Thomas, 65 S.W.3d at 44.
106. Id. at 45.
107. Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613, 615-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
108. Id. at 615.
109. Id. at 615-16.
110. Id. at 616 (citing Davidson v. State, 25 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
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missibility. 1 I Rather, the court of appeals' "analysis should examine the
absence of a magistrate on the admissibility [of] the statement in a con-
text of fairness to the parties."'' 2
Zavala v. State dealt with an appeal to determine whether the appel-
lant's extrajudicial statements could be used to support his conviction of
driving while intoxicated.' 1 3 At trial, the police officer testified about
statements made by appellant both at the scene and at the station con-
cerning the vehicle and the accident.114 The court recognized that
"[w]hile proof of the corpus delicti of an offense may not be made by an
extrajudicial confession alone, proof of the corpus delicti need not be
made independent of the extrajudicial confession. ' ll 5 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's conviction since there was some evidence
corroborating the appellant's confession, which allowed the confession to
be used to aid in establishing that he was driving a motor vehicle in a
public place while intoxicated. 116
In State v. Medrano, the State filed an interlocutory appeal to challenge
the trial court's exclusion of hypnotically-enhanced testimony from the
only eyewitness in a capital murder case. 117 The state contended that the
trial court's application of the test found in Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988), was improper because it relied upon the "general
acceptance" test, which the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled in Kelly
v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).118 First, the court dis-
cussed the Zani test, which instructs that a court should admit evidence if
based on the totality of the circumstances: "[T]he trial court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that hypnosis neither rendered the wit-
ness's posthypnotic memory untrustworthy nor substantially impaired the
ability of the opponent to fairly test the witness's recall by cross-examina-
tion."119 The court then disagreed with the state's contention that the
Kelly decision implicitly overruled Zani. Instead the court concluded that
Zani exists independent of the "general acceptance" test and that the reli-
ance on Zani in the Kelly decision suggests that Zani remains the law.120
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's application of Zani and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 121
In Hawkins v. State, a jury found appellant guilty of unlawful posses-
sion of a firearm by a felon and assessed punishment at 15 years impris-
onment, "[a]fter finding an enhancement paragraph [in the appellant's
111. Id. at 619.
112. Id.
113. Zavala v. State, 89 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
114. Id. at 135-36.
115. Id. at 137.
116. Id.
117. State v. Medrano, 86 S.W.3d 369, 370 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet h.)
118. Id. at 371.
119. Id. at 372.
120. Id. at 373.
121. Id.
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penitentiary packet] alleging a prior felony ... to be true. 1 22 First, the
court held that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict was legally sufficient to support the appellant's conviction. 123 Ap-
pellant also argued that the trial court erred by admitting the penitentiary
packet because under Article 42.09, section 8(b) of the Texas Code Crimi-
nal Procedure only the director of the Texas Department of Criminal Jus-
tice can authenticate such a document. 124 Finding no authority for
appellant's assertion, the court relied upon Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991), for the proposition that a public record can be
properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 901 due to the reg-
ularity in governmental affairs and disincentive for public officials to fal-
sify documents.125  Furthermore, the court found that a self-
authenticating document under Texas Rule of Evidence 902 need not sat-
isfy the certification requirements of Article 42.09, section 8(b) of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to be properly authenticated. 126 Ac-
cordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Lopez v. State127 dealt with "whether [the appellant] should have been
permitted under [Texas Rules of Evidence 613(a)] to introduce evidence
that.., the 12-year-old boy [appellant] was charged with sexually assault-
ing, had previously accused his mother of physical abuse."'1 28 The court
of appeals agreed with appellant's assertion that the boy's testimony was
inconsistent under Rule 613(a) and reversed the conviction. 12 9 The Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial
court's conviction because the boy's previous accusations were not shown
to be sufficiently inconsistent with his testimony at trial as required by
Rule 613(a). 130
In Robbins v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals confronted
"whether during the guilt/innocence phase of appellant's trial, the trial
court abused its discretion to admit evidence of previous injuries the vic-
tim suffered while she was in appellant's care. '131 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court, deciding that the evidence was "'probative of
intent and lack of accident under Rule 404(b) and that it was not 'unfairly
prejudicial' under Rule 403 because the 'prejudicial effect lies in its pro-
bative value rather than an unrelated matter." 32 Initially, the court rec-
122. Hawkins v. State, 89 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
123. Id. at 676-77.
124. Id. at 678.
125. Id. at 679.
126. Id.
127. Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
128. Id. at 229. Incidentally, the Court of Criminal Appeals had previously rejected the
appellant's argument that the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution com-
pelled its admissibility. Id.
129. Id. at 230.
130. Id.
131. Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).




ognized that current law created a "Catch 22" because "a simple plea of
not guilty does not make issues such as intent relevant issues of conse-
quence for relationship evidence Rule 404(b) purposes while at the same
time" the law requires the prosecution to prove these material issues be-
yond reasonable doubt. 133 The court determined, however, that it was
bound by stare decisis, making it "'better to be consistent than right' [and
that] any changes in the current law should come via amendment to the
Texas Rules of Evidence or by legislative enactment."1 34 Thus, based on
the current law, the court concluded that the court of appeals was correct
to affirm the trial court on the admissibility of the relationship evidence
because the appellant "went beyond simply pleading not guilty through
[his] vigorous cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses suggesting
that the victim's death was caused by some means other than an inten-
tional act by appellant." 135 Furthermore, the court could not say "the
Court of Appeals wrongly decided that the trial court was within its dis-
cretion [under Rule 403] to decide that the probative value of the rela-
tionship evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice especially in light of the defensive theories that the ap-
pellant presented. ' 136 Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of ap-
peals judgment.
In Wiley v. State, the appellant claimed that he was denied his constitu-
tional right to present a defense under his Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights to due process because the trial court refused to allow him to
present "alternative perpetrator" evidence. 37 Appellant, who was
charged and convicted with arson, claimed that the judge ruled incor-
rectly by refusing to allow him to put on evidence regarding a man who
he claimed started the fire at his restaurant. The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals noted that the trial court was correct in refusing to allow the appel-
lant to present such evidence under Rule 403 because he could not
demonstrate a sufficient "nexus between the crime charged and the al-
leged 'alternative perpetrator."' 138 The court noted that the "appellant
himself told the grand jury that he did not" believe that the alternative
perpetrator (Mr. Thomas) could have set the fire. Furthermore, Mr.
Thomas was mentally incompetent and there was meager evidence pro-
vided regarding how he could set such a sophisticated fire. Also, the
State was prepared to present evidence that Mr. Thomas's mother was
with him at the time he allegedly set the fire. Thus, because the evidence
regarding Mr. Thomas's involvement in the fire would have done nothing
more than confuse the issues at trial, the court held that the trial judge's
ruling in excluding the evidence was not clearly erroneous and did not
133. Id. at 261.
134. Id. (quoting Awaldelkariem v. State, 974 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 263 (emphasis in original).
137. Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
138. Id. at 406.
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violate the appellant's constitutional rights.139
In Torres v. State,140 the trial court excluded evidence of the victim's
prior bad acts on the grounds that they were directed towards a third
party and not the defendant. The judgment of the trial court was af-
firmed by the court of appeals. The judgment was reversed by the Court
of Criminal Appeals because evidence of the victim's previous violent
acts cannot be excluded merely because they were directed at a third
party and not the defendant. The court noted that the victim's previous
bad acts were admissible to show that he was the first aggressor if the acts
were not offered to show character conformity. Because the defendant
was the new boyfriend of the victim's ex-girlfriend and the evidence
demonstrated that the victim had "a mind set of violence against those
[that] might stand between him and [his ex-girlfriend]," the court found
that the proffered testimony was probative of the deceased's state of
mind, intent, and motive.141 Thus, the court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the case to the court of appeals.
In Keeter v. State, the trial court convicted appellant of indecency with a
child after the victim testified about his bad acts. 142 However, the victim,
an eight year old girl, "recanted shortly after the trial. 1 43 Therefore, the
appellant moved for a new trial, which was denied. The court of appeals
held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new
trial and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. Applying the four-part
test for newly discovered evidence, 144 the court held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in disbelieving the victim's recantation. Al-
though a trial court must have "some basis in the record" to disbelieve a
recantation, the trial court has such a basis if, among other things: "the
recanting witness was subject to pressure [from] family members or to
threats from co-conspirators, [the victim recants] after moving in with
family members of the defendant" and other questionable circum-
stances.' 45 The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because the victim: recanted after she moved in with persons friendly to
the defendant, testified that her father pressured her into recanting the
allegations, gave a non-convincing story about how she formed the idea
139. Id. at 408.
140. Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
141. Id. at 761-62.
142. Keeter v. State, 74 S.W.3d 31, 33-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
143. Id. at 46.
144. The four-part test is as follows:
(1) the newly-discovered evidence was unknown to the movant at the time
of trial;
(2) the movant's failure to discover the evidence was not due to his want of
diligence;
(3) the evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, col-
lateral, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is probably true and would probably bring about a different
result in another trial.
Id. at 35.
145. Id. at 38.
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to accuse the appellant from her three year old stepsister, and stated that
she recanted because her mother needed the defendant financially and
emotionally.' 46 Thus, there was sufficient evidence in the record provid-
ing some basis for the trial court to disbelieve the victim's recantation.
In Billy v. State, the "appellant contend[ed that] the trial court erred in
... denying his motion for instructed verdict" and that the trial court's
actions deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. 147 On appel-
lant's first point of error, the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that the jury
did not engage in the impermissible stacking of inferences to find that he
had the intent to commit the act of indecency with a child because of the
victim's testimony at trial. On appellant's second point of error, the court
held that the appellant failed to object to the trial court's allegedly im-
proper actions during voir dire and, thus, failed to preserve error. The
court further noted that the appellant failed to comply with the rules of
appellate procedure by inadequately briefing his allegations for appeal.
Thus, the court found that the only remaining issue that was properly
briefed and presented for appeal was "whether the trial court erred in
sustaining the State's objection to appellant's closing argument."'1 48 In
his closing argument, appellant made a comparison between the reasona-
ble doubt standard and a parent's hesitation when deciding whether his
or her child should endure a dangerous operation to get well. The court
held that this argument was improper because "the 'hesitation' definition
of reasonable doubt places too great a burden on the State [and is] inac-
curate and misleading.' 49 Therefore, the court held that "the trial court
[did not err] in sustaining the State's objection to [appellant's closing]
argument. '150
In Hines v. State,15' the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed two is-
sues: "1) whether the phrase 'interfere substantially' as it appears in sec-
tion 20.01 of the Texas Penal Code is ambiguous; and 2) whether the
kidnapping statute can be applied to situations where slight confinement
or movement is part of the commission of another offense."'1 52 The court
of appeals held that the defendant "did not interfere substantially with
[the victim's] liberty" in this case because there was no more than a tem-
porary confinement or slight movement that was part and parcel of an-
other crime. Thus, the court of appeals held that there was no abduction
and, hence, no kidnapping within the meaning of section 20.01 of the
Texas Penal Code. 153 The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
phrase "interfere substantially" in the context of the kidnapping statute
146. Id. at 39.
147. Billy v. State, 77 S.W.3d 427, 428 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd).
148. Id. at 430.
149. Id. at 430-31.
150. Id. at 431.
151. Hines v. State, 75 S.W.3d 444, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
152. Id. at 445.
153. Id. at 446-47. Texas Penal Code section 20.04(b) provides: "A person commits the
offense of aggravated kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person
and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense."
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was not ambiguous and that courts have consistently held that there is not
specific time requirement for determining whether a restraint has taken
place. Furthermore, there is "no per se bar to a kidnapping prosecution
for conduct that occurs during the commission of another offense."'1 54
Because the court found that, looking at all of the evidence in a light
favorable to the prosecution, "a rational juror could have found that [the
victim] was abducted by [the defendant]," the court reversed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals. 155
In Powell v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that by
cross-examining a complainant on the theory that the defendant lacked
opportunity to commit the crime, opens the door for unconvicted of-
fenses to come in to rebut the theory.156 The defendant was being
charged with indecency with a child and used the argument that the fact
that there were other individuals in the room when the crime was to have
taken place demonstrated that he lacked opportunity to commit the
crime of which he was accused. 157 The prosecution rebutted this theory
by introducing other witnesses that testified the defendant did the same
acts with them while other people were in the same room.158 The court
determined that this was proper rebuttal testimony.159 The trickier issue
for the court, which led to a disagreement among the justices, is whether
raising this defense in opening statements "opens the door" for the prose-
cution. The majority found that it did,160 but there were two concur-
rences, one which declined to resolve the issue,161 and the other that
found it was not appropriate because opening statements are not
evidence.162
In another "lack of opportunity" defense to a sexual assault charge, the
Court of Criminal Appeals found that the defendant opened the door to
the State's rebuttal of similar instances of conduct. 163 The defendant
called a CPS worker to the stand to testify that she had determined that
he was safe around his own children. 164 The court determined that it was
permissible for the State to cross-examine this witness on an alleged sex-
ual assault of his niece because, as an expert witness, she can be cross-
examined "concerning the facts and data upon which [she] relied [upon
and questioned] about information of which she was aware, but upon
which she did not rely. 1 65
154. Id. at 448.
155. Id.
156. Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
157. Id. at 436-37.
158. Id. at 437.
159. Id. at 438.
160. Id. at 439.
161. Id. at 440 (finding that "the majority need not decide whether an opening state-
ment would permit the same refutation of the appellant's defensive theory").
162. Id. at 440-41 (stating that "because an opening statement is not evidence, it should
not open the door to admission of extraneous offenses.").
163. Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 883, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
164. Id. at 881.
165. Id. at 883 (emphasis in original).
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In addition to its cross-examination of this witness, the State intro-
duced testimony of the defendant's niece, who claimed she had been mo-
lested by the defendant.1 66 The court found this testimony permissible,
since the defendant's entire defense was lack of opportunity to molest the
complainant. 67 This witness's testimony was relevant to rebut the defen-
dant's lack of opportunity defense because she testified that her assault
occurred with family members in the immediate vicinity and the defen-
dant's son only a few feet away. 168
In Smith v. State, the court of appeals ruled that expert testimony that
the defense tried to put forward was properly denied because no showing
that the witness was an expert was made.' 69 In this DWI case, "Smith did
not offer evidence of [the witness's] special knowledge of how the intox-
ilyzer works [nor did he] demonstrate that the [witness] was educated in a
field of science or math such that he could assist the trier of fact to under-
stand why there would be a variance in the intoxilyzer's measure-
ments."1 70 "Also, [the witness] was not shown to be trained or certified
in evaluating an individual's performance on the intoxilyzer.'' 1
On the other side, the expert testimony that the trial court permitted
the State to use in Smith was determined to be impermissible as well.172
The arresting officer improperly correlated Smith's performance on the
sobriety test to a particular blood-alcohol level.' 7 3 Additionally, the of-
ficer correlated Smith's performance on the walk-and-turn test to a pre-
cise blood-alcohol content, which was impermissible. 174 Despite the
improperly admitted evidence, the court of appeals determined that each
was harmless error.175
In Shpikula v. State, the court of appeals determined that there was a
proper evidentiary foundation for intoxilyzer test slips.176 First, "intox-
ilyzer maintenance records are generally admissible as business
records.' 77 Second, the officer was not required to wait 15 minutes to
retest the defendant.1 78
In Cooper v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed "that a
theft occurring immediately after an assault will support an inference that
the assault was intended to facilitate the theft. ' 179 The court chose not to
determine under what circumstances an inference would be negated by
166. Id. at 886.
167. Id. at 889.
168. Id. at 887.
169. Smith v. State, 65 S.W.3d 332, 341 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 345, 348.
173. Id. at 345.
174. Id. at 348.
175. Id. at 345, 348.
176. Shpikula v. State, 68 S.W.3d 212, 222-23 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
ref'd).
177. Id. at 222.
178. Id. at 223.
179. Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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evidence of an alternative motive.180 The court did determine, however,
that an "inference will not be negated by evidence of an alternative mo-
tive that the jury could rationally disregard."'181
In Potier v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that while
exclusion of testimony regarding self-defense was erroneously excluded,
the defendant was still able to put on the defense and therefore there was
no constitutional error.' 82 The court found that the defendant was denied
his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
because:
the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a wit-
ness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events
that he had personally observed and whose testimony would have
been relevant and material to the defense. 183
However, both the defendant and another witness testified to the self-
defense theory, which made this error harmless. 184
In a legal sufficiency challenge, the court of appeals in Freeman v. State,
determined that there was sufficient evidence to support a DWI convic-
tion.' 8 5 The circumstantial evidence of shifting the car into gear, and the
vehicle's wheel resting against the curb of a public street, was sufficient to
support the inference that the defendant was operating a vehicle while
intoxicated.' 86
In Willover v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit videotaped inter-
views of the victim in a sexual assault case. 187 The defendant wanted to
introduce two videotaped interviews with the victim because she gave in-
consistent stories. 88 The court determined that the trial court could have
found that the tapes contained both admissible and inadmissible testi-
mony and the burden was on the defense to isolate statements to use for
impeachment purposes. 18 9
B. JURY CHARGE
In Gilmore v. State, the court of appeals held that it was not error to
give a misleading instruction regarding the effect of "good conduct" time
on parole eligibility for someone convicted of murder. 90 "A jury found
appellant guilty of murder, and assessed punishment at life imprison-
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
183. Id. at 660.
184. Id. at 665-66.
185. Freeman v. State, 69 S.W.3d 374, 376 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
186. Id.
187. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
188. Id. at 842.
189. Id. at 846-47.




ment." 191 The trial court had instructed the jury that appellant's time in
prison may be reduced through the award of 'good conduct' time
[though] appellant was not eligible for such a reduction" because he was
serving prison time for murder. 192 While noting a contrary holding from
the First Court of Appeals, 193 the court held that "the instruction as a
whole correctly described the calculation of parole eligibility and the role
of 'good conduct' time in reducing the period of incarceration."1 94 Be-
cause the jury had been "warned that the award of 'good conduct' time
[could not] be predicted and that they should not consider the extent to
which 'good conduct' time might be awarded," appellant had not shown
egregious harm.195
In Thumann v. State, the court of appeals upheld appellant's conviction
for theft.' 96 The evidence showed that appellant had engaged in two sep-
arate transactions, each of which could have given to a conviction. In the
first, appellant falsely represented to the owner of some equipment that
he had rented the equipment when in fact he had sold it and kept the
proceeds. In the second, appellant, in obtaining a line of credit that went
unpaid, represented to a bank that he maintained sole ownership of
equipment that he put up as collateral when, in fact, the equipment was
simply at his business on consignment. Appellant argued that he was en-
titled to an instruction on the defense of "ownership" because, he
claimed, he and the equipment owner in the first transaction were in a
partnership. The court held that the exclusion of such an instruction was
not error because appellant merely sought an instruction to negate an
element of the offense, i.e., lack of consent. 197
In Dudley v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals determined
whether the defendant, who was convicted of possession of codeine in an
amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams, was entitled to a
jury instruction on the "ultimate user" exemption. 98 On appeal, the de-
fendant argued "that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to
the jury charge [that] it did not require the jury to find that [the defen-
dant] lacked a valid prescription for the codeine," as required by Texas
Health and Safely Code section 481.062(a)(3). 199 Texas Health and
Safely Code section 481.062(a)(3) provides that a person may possess a
controlled substance if that person is "an ultimate user or a person in
possession of the controlled substance under a lawful order of a practi-
191. Id. at 742.
192. Id.
193. Jimenez v. State, 992 S.W.2d 633, 638 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999), rev'd
on other grounds, 32 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
194. Gilmore, 68 S.W.3d at 743.
195. Id.
196. Thumann v. State, 62 S.W.3d 248, 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2001, no
pet.) (en banc).
197. Id. at 252.
198. Dudley v. State, 58 S.W.3d 296, 297 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.).
199. Id. at 301.
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tioner. °200 The court of appeals affirmed, explaining that "a person
claiming the benefit of the 'ultimate user' exemption or defense has the
burden of producing evidence that raises the defense. ' 20 1 Accordingly,
because the defendant "presented no evidence that he acquired the code-
ine by a valid prescription, he was not entitled to [an 'ultimate user'] jury
instruction. "202
In Mendoza v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed
"whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court prop-
erly refused requested paragraphs [to a jury charge], given that [the] is-
sues were controverted at trial. '20 3 After concluding that the excluded
paragraphs were contested issues at trial and evidence was in the record
supporting each party's contention, "[t]he court of appeals held that a
general jury instruction regarding the voluntariness of the confession was
all that was required by article 38.22, section 7 of the Texas Code of Crim-
inal Procedure.20 4 In its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted
that each of appellant's excluded paragraphs "dealt with the voluntari-
ness of his confession," although presenting different scenarios for
each.20 5 The court then held that the trial court "appropriately" charged
the jury under Article 38.22, section 7 of the Texas Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure because the trial court properly included the general instruction
about voluntariness and, within its discretion, excluded the fact-based in-
structions.206 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals.
In Boget v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of
"whether a jury charge on self-defense is available when a defendant is
charged with an offense other than one involving force against an-
other. °20 7 In this case, the appellant was charged with criminal mischief
because he shattered the windshield of a truck with his flashlight while
two people were in the vehicle. The appellant argued that he should be
permitted to offer a self-defense instruction to the jury because, accord-
ing to the appellant, the driver of the vehicle was trying to run him over
when he hit the windshield. The trial court held that he was not entitled
to the instruction because the offense that he was charged with, criminal
mischief, did not involve the use of force against another.208 The Court
of Criminal Appeals noted that section 9.31 of the Penal Code allows a
person to use "force against another when ... he reasonably believes the
force is immediately necessary to protect himself." The court noted that
the relevant inquiry was what it means to use direct force "against" an-
other. After considering the legislative history of the statute, the law in
200. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.062(a)(3) (Vernon 1992).
201. Dudley, 58 S.W.3d at 301.
202. Id.
203. Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
204. Id. at 238.
205. Id. at 240.
206. Id.
207. Boget v. State, 74 S.W.3d 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
208. Id. at 25.
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other jurisdictions, and the intent of the statute, the court overruled John-
son v. State209 to the extent that it held that self-defense was available
only where the defendant is charged with an offense involving the use of
force against another. 210 Specifically, although the appellant was not
charged with an offense related to the use of force against another such as
murder or battery, when he hit the windshield his force was directed
against the occupants of the vehicle. Thus, the appellant's actions satis-
fied the relevant inquiry-whether the appellants force was directed
against another-and he was entitled to a jury instruction on self-
defense.211
In Smith v. State, the court of appeals determined that to find a defen-
dant guilty of felony DWI, a jury did not have to explicitly state that it
found the defendant had been twice convicted of DWI.212 Smith had
stipulated that he had previously been convicted, and that stipulation was
admitted into evidence during the trial.213 The court determined that this
was enough to find the defendant guilty of felony DWI, since a jury must
not find by special issue that prior convictions exist.2 14
Smith also challenged the manner in which the evidence was obtained
against him.2 15 He argued "that a jury instruction was necessary because
the arresting officer did not observe any suspicious conduct before he
made the decision to detain Smith. '216 The court determined that since
two witnesses testified that they observed drunken behavior and Smith
did not challenge this testimony, there were "no fact issues regarding the
legality of the manner in which the evidence was obtained." 21 7
Similarly, in Shpikula v. State, the court of appeals found that because
Shpikula did not challenge the State's proof regarding the justification of
the traffic stop, there was no factual dispute that required a special jury
charge.218 In this DWI case, the defendant argued that even though the
arresting officers testified that "they observed [his] tail light was out from
a quarter of a mile away, the testimony was unbelievable [and] therefore,
there was a conflict in the testimony.121 9 However, because the defen-
dant "did not testify or call any witness [to] controvert [ ] the State's
proof regarding the justification for the traffic stop," the court deter-
mined "that the trial court did not err in refusing the [requested jury]
charge." 220
209. Johnson v. State, 650 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
210. Id. at 31.
211. Id.
212. Smith v. State, 65 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 342.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 342-43.
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In another DWI case, Vrba v. State, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred by failing to instruct the jury to acquit him "if it found that
[the officer] did not have a legally permissible basis for the stop."'2 2 1 The
court of appeals agreed, since Vrba's testimony regarding his driving was
inconsistent with the officer's testimony regarding the same. 222 The trial
court had been "statutorily bound" to submit the instruction and because
"[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence of . . . guilt independent of that
obtained as a result of the stop," the defendant suffered "some harm"
and the error required reversal. 223
C. PUNISHMENT
In Mann v. State,224 the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the court
of appeals' opinion in rejecting the appellant's contention that Article
42.12, section 3g(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, did not
authorize a deadly weapon finding in any prosecution for driving while
intoxicated. The appellant had been convicted for driving while intoxi-
cated, third offense. The evidence showed that appellant had "nearly hit
another vehicle head-on while driving and that a collision was avoided
only because the other driver took evasive action. '225 The jury found
that appellant "had used a deadly weapon, namely an automobile, during
the commission of the offense. ' 226 This "deadly weapon finding limits a
defendant's eligibility for community supervision and parole. ' 227 The ap-
pellant argued that, because the use of an automobile was an element of
the underlying offense, his punishment could not be enhanced simply by
the use of the automobile during the commission of the DWI. In holding
otherwise, the court of appeals had held that a "deadly weapon" finding
was permissible if others were endangered, but not if there was "merely a
hypothetical potential for danger if others had been present. '22 8
In Bawcom v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue
of "whether the trial court may consider actions taken by the state before
[a] motion to revoke is filed in determining whether the state has exer-
cised due diligence in apprehending [a] probationer. 2 29 Before filing a
motion to revoke probation, "the state made numerous efforts to contact
the probationer. '230 After the capias issued, however, the state made
"few efforts to contact him and the probationer was not apprehended
221. Vrba v. State, 69 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
222. Id. at 719.
223. Id.
224. Mann v. State, 58 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
225. Id. at 132.
226. Id.
227. Id. at n.1 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (Vernon 1979); TEX.
Gov'T CODE §§ 508.145, .149, .151 (Vernon 1998).
228. Mann v. State, 13 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000), affd, 58 S.W.3d 132
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
229. Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
230. Id. at 361.
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until after his probationary period had expired."'231 "[T]he Court of Ap-
peals discounted efforts to contact [the probationer] made before the mo-
tion to revoke was filed (and the capias issued)" and reversed and
remanded to the trial court for it to dismiss the state's motion to re-
voke.2 32 The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded, "hold[ing] that the
trial court may consider such evidence. '233
In Ellerbe v. State, after accepting the defendant's plea of nolo con-
tendere, the state violated the agreement by revoking the defendant's
probation when he refused to admit guilt in the course of a court-ordered
treatment program.234 The defendant "pleaded nolo contendere to the
felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of 14"
after a mistrial.2 35 "[T]he trial court deferred adjudication of [his] guilt
and placed [the defendant under] community supervision" pursuant to his
plea agreement.2 36 The community supervision required the defendant to
attend a counseling program, which requested him to sign a document
stating he had committed sexual assault.237 The defendant refused to sign
the document, failed to meet other program requirements, and was termi-
nated from the program.238 After the defendant was terminated from a
second program with similar requirements, "the trial court found [the de-
fendant] had failed to submit to ...treatment, found him guilty, and
assessed his punishment of 18 years at confinement" upon the state's sec-
ond motion to adjudicate guilt.239 The defendant appealed, alleging the
trial court and state violated his plea agreement. 240 The First Court of
Appeals determined that his "plea of nolo contendere [did] not relieve
[the] defendant from having to admit [he committed] an offense so [he
could] fully participate in a treatment program as a condition of commu-
nity supervision" and that thus his plea agreement was not violated.241
Accordingly, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of juris-
diction because it could "not consider any complaint concerning [an]
original plea," which was essentially what the defendant was
challenging.242
Sunbury v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals decided, as a matter of
law, evidence of appellant's non-final sentences was inadmissible under
Article 37.07, section 3(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.243
As "one of the guiding principles for the admissibility of evidence at the
231. Id.
232. Id. at 362.
233. Id. at 361.








241. Id. at 723.
242. Id.
243. Sanbury v. State, 88 S.W.3d 229, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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punishment phase of a trial [Article 37.07, section 3(a)] permits the intro-
duction of relevant punishment evidence, including extraneous offense
evidence, by the State and the defendant. '244 Here, following the policy
reasons identified in Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999), the court held that "the punishment assessed for non-final convic-
tions is relevant evidence during the punishment phase at trial. '245 The
court reasoned that "[j]ust as it is important that the fact-finder take into
account whether the objectives of the Penal Code will be furthered by the
imposition of a harsher sentence, it is equally important to take the objec-
tives into consideration when deciding whether any circumstances war-
rant imposition of a lesser sentence. '246 Thus, the court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals, which concluded that "the trial court
erred in excluding the evidence based on the ground that the prior
sentences were not final convictions. '2 47
In Burnett v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted
"[d]iscretionary [r]eview to determine whether the court of appeals prop-
erly reversed appellant's conviction because the trial judge failed to ad-
monish [the] appellant regarding the punishment range for his offense, as
required by Code of Crim. Proc. art. 26.13."248 First, the court agreed
with the court of appeal's judgment that the failure to admonish appellant
regarding the range of punishment was clearly error under Article 26.13
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.249 The court, however, dis-
agreed "with the court of appeals' analysis and conclusion on the harm
issue. '250 The court concluded that "a reviewing court [pursuant to Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)] must independently examine the
record for indications [of the defendant's awareness] of the consequences
of his plea and whether he was misled or harmed by the trial court's fail-
ure to admonish him of the punishment range. '251 The court then found
that the "record [was] replete with statements concerning the applicable
range of punishment" and, as a result, the error by the trial court was not
misleading or harmful.252 Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded
to the court of appeals "for consideration of appellant's remaining points
of error. '2
53
In Smith v. State, the defendant argued that "at the punishment stage
... the jury should [be] instructed to not take into account [a defendant's]
failure to testify at the guilt-innocence stage of trial. '254 The court deter-
mined that there is no authority for this proposition and overruled this
244. Id. at 233.
245. Id. at 235.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
249. Id. at 637.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 638.
252. Id. at 635.
253. Id.
254. Smith v. State, 65 S.W.3d 332, 341 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
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point of error. 255
In Cuellar v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the
defendant could not be convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm
because his prior felony conviction had been set aside.2 56 After the de-
fendant had successfully completed probation for his heroin conviction,
the trial court set aside the conviction and dismissed the indictment.257
The court found that this is not a conviction, and therefore the defendant
could not be charged as a felon in possession of a firearm.258
III. APPEAL
In Hernandez v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held "that the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
[constitutional] error," reversing the court of appeals' holding that such
error was non-constitutional error not to be analyzed under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 44.2(a).2 59 Appellant was convicted for possession
of cocaine with the intent to deliver. During the punishment phase of the
trial, the trial court allowed the admission of evidence seized during an
unlawful traffic stop. The court of appeals held that the evidence should
have been excluded, but that the error was non-constitutional because it
"did not directly offend the United States Constitution, was not required
by the Constitution itself, and therefore was not a federal constitutional
error for purposes of 44.2(a). '260
In reversing, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Bumper v. North Carolina,261 in which the
court held that the proper harm analysis for evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment was "harmless error. '262 The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals explained that "[c]onstitutional rights ... do not contain ex-
press exclusionary rules," but those rights and the constitutional
exclusionary rules derive from the constitution and its amendments. Ac-
cordingly, "the harm analysis for the erroneous admission of evidence
[seized] in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be Rule 44.2(a)'s
constitutional standard. '263
In Jones v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined "whether a
conviction is 'final' for purposes of the mandatory driver's license suspen-
sion statute after a defendant pleads guilty and is sentenced but before
the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired. ' 264 The court of ap-
peals reversed, determining that "because the [defendant's] underlying
255. Id.
256. Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
257. Id. at 816.
258. Id. at 820.
259. Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
260. Hernandez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 492, 508 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000), rev'd and
remanded, 60 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
261. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
262. Id. at 550.
263. Hernandez, 60 S.W.3d at 108.
264. Jones v. State, 77 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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conviction remained subject to appellate review at the time he was
charged, . . . his underlying conviction was not final. ' 265 The Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that "when there is no evidence that
[the] defendant ever filed a notice of appeal, a conviction is deemed to be
final on the date of the sentencing. '266
Motilla v. State involved the issue of whether an appellate court is re-
quired to disregard overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt in a
harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). 267 A
juvenile certified to stand trial as an adult appealed his capital murder
conviction on the grounds "that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient and that the trial judge erred [in] allowing the testimony of
[the victim's] mother because it was irrelevant and its more prejudicial
than probative. '268 The court of appeals reversed and remanded, deter-
mining that the evidence was sufficient but that the trial judge erred in
admitting the victim's mother's testimony and that it influenced the jury
under a harm analysis. 269 The court of appeals indicated that an appel-
late court should not focus on guilt in a harm analysis. 270 Reversing, the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that evidence of the defendant's guilt is a
factor that should be considered in a harm analysis under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 44.2(b).271
The issue in Johnson v. State is whether a defendant's general notice of
appeal from a plea-bargained conviction invokes the court of appeals'
jurisdiction.272 "After their motions to suppress evidence were denied,
the [defendants] plead guilty to ... drug offenses, pursuant to plea bar-
gains. '273 Subsequently, the defendants "filed 'general' notices of appeal
...stat[ing] that the named defendant 'excepting to the ruling of the
court, filed this written notice of appeal of said conviction to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(b)(1).'"274
On appeal, the defendants claimed the trial court erroneously denied
their motions to suppress. 275 The State responded that the court of ap-
peals' jurisdiction was not invoked through the general notices of ap-
peal. 276 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and dismissed the
appeals, holding that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy the no-
tice of appeal requirements from plea-bargained convictions but that the
defendants' general notice of appeal did not evoke the court of appeals'
265. Jones v. State, 21 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000), rev'd, 77 S.W.3d
819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
266. Jones, 77 S.W.3d at 820.
267. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 353-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
268. Id. at 355.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 356.
271. Id. at 360.
272. Johnson v. State, 84 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).






jurisdiction, overruling Riley v. State.277
Strong v. State dealt with the threshold issue of whether the court's
jurisdiction over the state's cross-point of error was properly invoked
under Article 44.01(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.2 78 Rec-
ognizing a split on the issue, the court was "not persuaded by the reason-
ing of the courts" that do not require the state to file a notice of appeal
when it appeals pursuant to article 44.01(c). 279 Instead, the court dis-
missed the state's cross-point of error for lack of jurisdiction, "agree[ing]
with the Austin and Beaumont courts that the State must file a notice of
appeal pursuant to appellate rule 25.2(a).1280 The court also concluded
that it would not have had jurisdiction over the State's point of error even
if the State had filed a notice of appeal because interpreting Article
44.01(c) to allow the appeal of an acquittal on the driving while intoxi-
cated ("DWI") offense would have violated the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution.281 Finally, the court "agree[d] with appel-
lant that the concept of attempted DWI [as a lesser included offense]
does not fit the statutory scheme provided by the legislature ... and it is
not consistent with the penal code's [policy] of insuring the public
safety. s282 Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's conviction of
attempted DWI and rendered judgment that appellant was acquitted of
the charged offense of DWI.
In Hailey v. State, "appellant claimed [at trial] that the results of his
blood-alcohol test should have been suppressed, arguing that the blood
drawn by [a] hospital worker constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure by the police under the Fourth Amendment.''283 "The trial court
denied appellant's motion to suppress," finding that the blood-alcohol
test was reasonable in light of appellant's intoxication, and not at the di-
rection of the police.284 Appellant's theory on appeal asserted that his
blood was taken in violation of the Texas Transportation Code because
no one died as a result of the accident, which is required under the stat-
ute.2 85 The court of appeals rejected appellant's theory but decided the
"appellant's blood-alcohol test should have been suppressed because the
hospital worker's [withdrawal of appellant's blood] was an unlawful as-
sault. ' 286 The court affirmed the trial court's judgment and reversed the
court of appeals decision because "it violate[d] 'ordinary notions of pro-
cedural default' for a court of appeals to reverse a trial court's decision on
a legal theory not presented to the trial court by the complaining
277. Id. at 660-61 (citing Riley v. State, 825 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
278. Strong v. State, 87 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
279. Id. at 212.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 213-14.
282. ld. at 218.
283. Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.2d 118, 119-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
284. Id. at 120.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 121.
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party." 287
Ellison v. State dealt with whether the court of appeals applied the
proper harm analysis, as required by Almanza288 and its progeny.289 In
Ellison, a jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery and "assessed
punishment at ninety-nine years in prison and a $5,000 fine." "During
the punishment phase of trial, the trial court admitted evidence of extra-
neous offenses, but failed to instruct the jury that, before it could con-
sider the extraneous-offense evidence, it must find that the state had
proved those acts beyond a reasonable doubt. '290
According to the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ellison, the appellate
court correctly noted that the error by the trial court was its "failure to
give, sua sponte, a reasonable-doubt instruction regarding the extraneous
offenses."'291 In addition, the court of appeals correctly noted "that the
error must be reviewed under the ... Almanza criteria," which requires
the court to assess the degree of harm based on the entire jury charge,
and the entire state of the evidence.292 The court concluded, however,
that the court of appeals erred because it applied its analysis to the wrong
issues. Instead of a finding of error on the admission of the evidence, the
court of appeals should have focused on the omission of the reasonable-
doubt instruction.293 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals re-
manded the case to the court of appeals for a harm analysis on the impact
of the omission of the reasonable-doubt instruction.
In Hampton v. State, "police officers took appellant, a juvenile, into
custody [and] told his mother that they were doing so because he had
absconded from juvenile probation. '294 "The next morning, without re-
establishing contact with appellant's mother, [a police] officer questioned
the appellant about a... murder," to which the "[a]ppellant gave a video-
taped statement," admitting to the murder. 295 "A jury convicted appel-
lant and sentenced him to 35 years imprisonment. '296 The court of
appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, "finding that: 1)
appellant's videotaped statement was taken in violation of sec-
tion 52.02(b); and 2) the State's failure to disclose potentially exculpatory
material was harmful .... 297
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the
case.298 First, the court concluded that there was no violation of section
287. Id. at 122 (quoting State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998)).
288. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
289. Ellison v. State, 86 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
290. Ellison, 86 S.W.3d at 226.
291. Id. at 227.
292. Id. at 228.
293. Id.




298. Id. at 606.
2003] 1473
SMU LAW REVIEW
52.02(b) of the Texas Family Code because the officer "promptly notified
both appellant's mother and the appropriate juvenile authorities that he
had taken appellant into custody and [the] reason for doing so. ''299 The
rationale for the court's conclusion included the determination that the
"statement of the reason for taking the child into custody" did not mean
"the legal reason for taking the child into custody, and any other suspi-
cions. ' 300 Furthermore, the court concluded that it could not "determine
whether the court of appeals applied the standard for Brady error rather
than an inappropriate general harmless error."'301 Thus, the court "re-
mand[ed] the case to the court of appeals for it to determine whether
appellant has demonstrated that the State's failure to timely produce a
police officer's supplementary report was material" under the proper
Brady error analysis. 302
Bishop v. State dealt with "[w]hether the court of appeals erred in hold-
ing that appellant failed to present evidence that her detention was con-
ducted without a search warrant. '30 3 After the trial court denied
appellant's motion to suppress evidence on affidavit evidence alone, a
jury "convicted [her] of possession of cocaine weighing at least 400 grams,
with intent to deliver," and "assessed [her] punishment at 60 years con-
finement and a $250,000 fine."' 304 "[T]he court of appeals, without reach-
ing the merits, overruled appellant's claim of lack of probable cause for
the initial traffic stop" and affirmed appellant's judgment and sen-
tence. 30 5 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "unanimously concluded
that the court of appeals should have considered ... the merits of appel-
lant's motion and the attached affidavit under article 28.01, section 1(6)
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure since there were no witnesses
called and no evidence was presented at a hearing on the motion to sup-
press.30 6 Thus, the court sustained appellant's ground for review, re-
versed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case.
In State v. Martinez, the trial court held that the defendant's recorded
conversations with the city attorney were protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 30 7 The State appealed, and the appellate court, relying on State
v. Roberts,308 refused to hear the case on the basis that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 44.01(a)(5). However, noting that it had recently overruled Rob-
erts in State v. Medrano,30 9 and "held that Article 44.01(a)(5) is not lim-
ited solely to pretrial rulings that suppress 'illegally obtained' evidence,"
299. Id. at 611.
300. Id. at 609-10.
301. Id. at 612.
302. Id. at 606.
303. Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 820 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
304. Id. at 820.
305. Id. at 821-22.
306. Id. at 822.
307. State v. Martinez, 70 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
308. State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
309. State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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the Court of Criminal Appeals "vacate[d] the judgment of the court of
appeals, and remand[ed the case] for reconsideration in light of the
[Medrano decision]."
In Idowu v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of
"whether a court of appeals should determine the correct amount of resti-
tution that a defendant must pay as a condition of probation, when the
defense argues-at a hearing on a motion for new trial which raises an
ineffective assistance of counsel issue-that restitution should never have
been ordered in the first place. '310 The court answered "no" when the
appellant did not preserve the restitution issue for appellate review. The
court noted that in a sufficiency of the evidence review, the appellant
need not preserve issues by objection at the trial level in order to raise
them on appeal. However, the court noted that it need not address
"whether a party must object to preserve a sufficiency claim concerning a
restitution order" because, in this case, there was a factual basis for the
restitution ordered by the trial court. 31' Thus, "because [appellant] failed
to make a specific [objection] in the trial court at the time [that] the order
was imposed," he waived the issue for appeal.312
In Hull v. State, the defendant attempted to argue for the first time on
direct appeal that the trial court's zero tolerance probation violated due
process. 313 The court determined that this argument was waived by the
defendant who failed to raise the issue in the trial court.314 First, the
defendant did not object to the zero tolerance policy at the imposition of
his conditions of probation. 31 5 Second, he did not object when his proba-
tion was revoked.316
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Woods v. State, the appellant's conviction for attempted sexual as-
sault was reversed on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. 317 The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to a plea
bargaining agreement, and the trial court assessed the punishment recom-
mended in that agreement. However, appellant later appealed, raising
issues as to his mental capacity at the time of the offense and at the time
he accepted the plea bargain. The court of appeals remanded the case to
the trial court for the appointment of counsel to address whether appel-
lant received ineffective assistance of counsel, in view of appellant's his-
tory of mental illness, by failing to file a notice of intent to present an
insanity defense and by failing to request the appointment of a defense
mental health expert. On appeal, the court held that, even though appel-
310. Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918, 918-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
311. Id. at 922.
312. Id. at 923.
313. Hull v. State, 67 S.W.3d 215, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
314. Id. at 217-18.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Woods v. State, 59 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. granted).
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lant's trial counsel failed to follow the strictures of Article 46.03 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in raising an insanity defense, appel-
lant suffered no prejudice because the issue was raised by filing a "Mo-
tion for Psychiatric Examination: Sanity" that was the custom in Harris
County.318
The court found, however, that under the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Ake v. Oklahoma,319 the state was required to provide
appellant with a psychiatrist's assistance once he made a preliminary
showing that his sanity at the time of the offense was likely to be a signifi-
cant factor at trial.320 Given appellant's "significant recorded history of
mental illness ... defense counsel was required to request the court-ap-
pointed assistance of a mental health expert. '321 The "failure to do so
was prejudicial and undermine[d the] confidence in the outcome of the
proceedings," requiring reversal. 322
In Bone v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined whether
the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel under the stan-
dard of Strickland v. Washington.323 The defendant argued on appeal
that his counsel was ineffective by:
(1) failing to pursue prejudice among prospective jurors; (2) making
offensive remarks regarding drinking and driving; (3) failing to offer
any significant evidence in his favor during the punishment phase of
the trial; (4) offering evidence during the punishment phase of the
trial that was harmful to his credibility; (5) failing to make the cor-
rect objection to the State's attempt to offer into evidence a docu-
ment which weighed directly on his credibility; and (6) making
statements that affirmatively prejudiced him.324
The court of appeals concluded that counsel's efforts were minimal and
reversed and remanded.32 5 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed,
holding that "an appellate court may [not] reverse a conviction on inef-
fective assistance of counsel grounds when counsel's actions or omissions
may have been based upon tactical decisions. '326
In Purchase v. State, the First Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether defense counsel's failure to investigate the defendant's psychiat-
ric condition to determine if he was competent to stand trial amounted to
ineffective assistance. 327 A jury found the defendant guilty of theft and
318. Id. at 837.
319. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
320. Woods, 59 S.W.3d at 837.
321. Id. at 838.
322. Id.
323. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
324. Id. at 832.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 830.
327. Purchase v. State, 84 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst. Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
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he was sentenced to four years probation. 328 The defendant appealed,
arguing, among other issues, that his counsel's failure to ask him about
his psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance.329 The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that "there [was] no evidence that counsel
knew of factors, such as disability payments or a lack of understanding
about trial proceedings, that might have prompted further investigation
into [the defendant's] competency. '330
In Cochran v. State, the appellant claimed that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel and his parole was revoked because his trial counsel
"failed to file any pre-trial discovery motions,... did not request a con-
tinuance when his subpoenaed witness failed to attend the revocation
hearing [and] failed to demand a separate hearing on punishment."' 331
The court of appeals held that the appellant was not denied effective as-
sistance of counsel because: another witness appeared and testified in the
subpoenaed witness' place, appellant's counsel reasonably exercised his
judgment in allowing the other witness to testify, the appellant's mother
gave punishment testimony during the revocation hearing, and the appel-
lant failed to allege any evidence that he believed his trial attorney failed
to obtain.332 The court held "that the trial court [did not err] in failing to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on [appellant's] motion for new trial" be-
cause the motion was never presented to the trial court.333 Furthermore,
appellant filed the motion for new trial and his appeal on the same day,
depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to hear his motion for new trial.
The court also concluded that appellant did not preserve his argument
that he deserved a separate hearing on punishment for appeal. 334 The
court held that the appellant's right to due process was not denied "be-
cause he was not ordered to attend an educational program designed to
rehabilitate [offenders] who have driven while intoxicated" because he
did not preserve the issue for appeal and because the trial court is permit-
ted to waive the educational program requirement. 335 Finally, the court
held that "It]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appel-
lant's probation. '336
In Mitchell v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argu-
ment that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel be-
cause his attorney permitted him to wear an incriminating shirt during
voir dire.337 The defendant came to court wearing a shirt like the one the
robber wore. 338 The State conceded that there was a deficiency in per-
328. Id. at 698.
329. Id. at 700.
330. Id. at 700-01.
331. Cochran v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, no pet.).
332. Id. at 24-25.
333. Id. at 25.
334. Id. at 26.
335. Id. at 26-27.
336. Id. at 28.
337. Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
338. Id. at 643.
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formance on the part of defendant's counsel, but the court noted that the
defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by this deficiency. 339 The
court found that the fact that the defendant "was wearing the shirt by his
own choice the day after the robbery when he was arrested and taken to
jail [and] that he was arrested in the shirt was in evidence independent of
his wearing it in front of the venire. ''340
V. HABEAS CORPUS
In In Ex Parte Anderer,341 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
condition that appellant not operate a motor vehicle during the pendency
of his appeal was a reasonable condition of bail. Appellant was convicted
of criminally negligent homicide arising out of an accident where appel-
lant was driving a commercial vehicle. The appellant gave notice of ap-
peal, and "[t]he district court set his bail at $50,000 and imposed on the
bail the condition that appellant 'was not operate any type of motor vehi-
cle .. . ",342 The appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
that the condition was unreasonable and violated his due process rights.
The district court held a hearing, at which time the appellant admitted he
had been in another "injury accident" while operating a commercial vehi-
cle, and denied relief. "A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
reversed. "343
The Court of Criminal Appeals first notes the difference between bail
before trial and bail pending appeal. The former "permits the un-
hampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment before conviction;" while the latter only protects the interest
in "protecting the defendant from an erroneous judgment. '344 The inter-
est of appellants must be balanced against society's interest in enforcing
the penal laws, chief among those interests being the public safety. In this
case, appellant was "convicted of killing an individual [while] driving his
vehicle," and he previously had been in another injury accident. Thus,
the condition that he not operate any vehicle was reasonable in protect-
ing the public safety.345
In Ex parte Fierro, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined the limi-
tations of manifest necessity. 346 The trial court declared a mistrial when
one jury member in a trial over two alleged incidents of sexual assault
stated she was the defendant's cousin, which the trial court understood to
mean she was related to the defendant within the third degree of consan-
guinity under Article 35.16(b)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Ex Parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc).
342. Id. at 398.
343. Anderer v. State, 7 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999), rev'd 61
S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
344. Ex Parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 405-06.
345. Id. at 406.
346. Ex Parte Fierro, 79 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
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dure. 347 The trial court determined it "could not proceed to a verdict in a
criminal case with eleven jurors. '348 "The juror at issue, [however,] was
not ... related to [the defendant] within the third degree of consanguin-
ity."' 349 The defendant "filed motions to dismiss and petitions for writ of
habeas corpus seeking to [bar] re-trial [because] jeopardy had attached
when the jury [was] selected and sworn and that there was no showing
that the mistrial had been mandated by manifest necessity. ' 350 The trial
court denied the motions and petitions.351 The court of appeals upheld
the trial court's rulings even though "the trial court found manifest neces-
sity without first asking the parties whether they were willing to proceed
to trial with eleven jurors. ' 352 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declar-
ing a mistrial because it did not consider "any less drastic alternatives as
is required by Brown [such as] determin[ing] if the parties would be will-
ing to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors under Tex. Govt. Code
§ 62.201." 353
VI. MANDAMUS
The Court of Appeals for Corpus Christi, in In re Rodriguez, addressed
a petition for writ of mandamus relating to the issue of "whether a con-
victing court may deny an indigent person's request for appointment of
counsel to assist him in presenting a motion for DNA testing to the
court. '354 The court, after first noting the requirements that need to be
met in order to obtain mandamus relief, held that Article 64.01(c) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that "a convicted person is enti-
tled to counsel in a proceeding for DNA testing" so long as he is indigent
and he requests counsel. 355 Because there is not a requirement that the
indigent prove "a prima facie case of entitlement to DNA testing before"
he or she has such a right to counsel, the court held that "respondent had
a ministerial duty to appoint counsel for relator. '356 Thus, the court
"conditionally grant[ed] relator's petition for writ of mandamus and di-
rect[ed] respondent [to] appoint counsel to represent relator" and recon-
sider relator's motion for post-conviction DNA testing after appointing
counsel.
347. Id. at 55.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 56.
350. Id. at 55.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 59.
353. Id. at 57 (citing Brown v. State, 907 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
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